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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to initiate a quantitative theory of credit risk rele-
vant to scenarios that contributed to the credit crunch of 2008. We have in
mind specifically the experience of Ireland and Spain, in which banks funded
massive investments in property developments on the basis of heroically opti-
mistic valuations of the return on these investments. At the World Economic
Forum, Davos (2012), Enda Kenny, Taoiseach of Ireland, noted that ‘Ireland’s
problems stem from a kind of madness that led to the country borrowing $60
billion at unrealistically high rates’. It is obvious that any explanation must
include behavioural factors.
In this paper we study a project finance problem involving two parties,
– Bank (B), which borrows from other commercial banks or a central bank,
at funding rate rf and lends to entrepreneurs;
– Entrepreneur (E) who borrows funds from B at a contract rate rc in order
to finance a project that will deliver a product of value G at time T .
E’s loan will be paid off (with interest) in a bullet repayment at T . The
investment project is the collateral for the loan, but of course its value is
uncertain until T . B will insist that an over-collateralization ratio κ > 1 be
maintained at all times t ∈ [0, T ], based on B’s current assessment of the value
G, and will insist on margin payments should this ratio be breached. This
is what makes the loan so risky: E has to use other capital (assumed to be
invested in the financial markets) to make margin payments, and if this capital
is insufficient the loan will be foreclosed and the project sold off at a ‘fire sale’
price—some fraction of its pre-default assessed value at time t.
Clearly, the key question here is how B assesses the value of the project. E
is, as Keynes says in the quote below, an optimist, but B should take a rational
view. We assume B abides by the principles of market-consistent valuation,
i.e. uses a model such that no arbitrage would be introduced if the project
were traded at the model price in addition to existing traded asset in the
market. This principle allows (see §2.2 below) a wide range of estimates, and
we assume that B’s valuation is affected by ‘confidence’ as represented by
published business or consumer confidence indices.
In our analysis we find ourselves at the intersection of six lines of thought,
namely (i) ‘animal spirits’, (ii) confidence indices, (iii) the financial instability
hypothesis (iv) market-consistent valuation, (v) the nume´raire portfolio, and
(vi) structural models of credit risk. In Section 2 we give some background
information on these topics that informs the models we construct and analyse
in subsequent sections. Our project finance model is introduced in Section
3, and results for a simply computable example are described in Section 4.
This section also discusses the computational requirements for larger-scale
problems. The final section 5 gives a brief discussion of the problems concerning
quantification of ‘animal spirits’.
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2 Background
2.1 Animal spirits.
John Maynard Keynes is not always recognized as a founding father of be-
havioural finance but, as in so many areas, the great man got there first.
Indeed, in his Nobel Prize lecture, George Akelof (2003) states that ‘Keynes’
General Theory was the greatest contribution to behavioral economics before
the present era’. The key to Keynes’ thinking can be found in the General
Theory (Keynes 2007, page 161):
[A] large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous
optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral
or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do some-
thing positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over
many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits1—
of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by
quantitative probabilities.
While nobody, surely, could disagree with the basic point, there is a mixed
message here in that Keynes appears to be warning us off probabilistic and
statistical analysis, and indeed he was quite sceptical about it, as reported by
Akerlof and Shiller (2009, page 16). This point of view was in fact prevalent
at the time. Frank Knight, whose seminal work substantiated the distinction
between risk and uncertainty, noted in Knight (1921):
It is a world of change in which we live, and a world of uncertainty. We
live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems
of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so
little. This is as true of business as of other spheres of activity. The
essence of the situation is action according to opinion, of greater or
less foundation and value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and
perfect information, but partial knowledge. If we are to understand
the workings of the economic system we must examine the meaning
and significance of uncertainty; and to this end some inquiry into the
nature and function of knowledge itself is necessary.
Knight categorizes ‘probabilities’ into
1. A priori probability, a probability that can be computed exactly and objec-
tively because the exact nature and structure of the underlying experiment
is known;
2. Statistical probability, an empirical probability;
3. Estimates
Concerning estimates, Knight writes:
1 The phrase is an allusion to the classical term spiritus animalis conveying the idea of
animation, not atavism!
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It is this third type of probability or uncertainty which has been ne-
glected in economic theory, and which we propose to put in its rightful
place. As we have repeatedly pointed out, an uncertainty which can
by any method be reduced to an objective, quantitatively determinate
probability, can be reduced to complete certainty by grouping cases.
[. . .] The present and more important task is to follow out the con-
sequences of that higher form of uncertainty not susceptible to mea-
surement and hence to elimination. It is this true uncertainty which
by preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of the tendencies of
competition gives the characteristic form of ‘enterprise’ to economic
organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of the
entrepreneur.
This message is markedly different from the ideas promoted by standard
financial economics starting in the 1950s: uncertainty appears as irrelevant
because it can be diversified away or hedged against. The implication is that
rational decision makers should rely on a priori probabilities when known or
on statistical probabilities to form their opinions. Decision makers who are not
rational, such as noise traders, will be arbitraged out of the economy.
The flourishing field of behavioural finance has demonstrated convincingly
that the view held by standard finance theory is not tenable stricto sensu.
Noise traders are alive and well and arbitrage is fraught with difficulties (see
for example Shleifer (2000) for a discussion). Although most of the ideas and
tests performed by behavioural finance theorist focus on pure decision theory
and on psychology, behavioural finance does not exclude quantitative models
and methods. In fact the scope for quantitative methods is much greater now
than it was in the 1920s and 1930s, or even in the 1950s and 1960s thanks
to the creation of confidence indices designed to gauge ‘animal spirits,’ the
development of a theory of financial economics and advances in computational
technology.
2.2 Confidence indices.
Data on confidence indices is now widely available, see for example Markit
(2011). There are two varieties, the consumer confidence index and the pur-
chasing managers’ index (PMI). Both are based on surveys, and represent re-
spectively the propensity of consumers to go out and spend, and the propensity
of businesses to invest. In the United States, consumer confidence is measured
by the Conference Board and by the University of Michigan. The main dif-
ference between the two surveys is in the time horizon: while the Conference
Board polls households on their expectations over the next six months, the Uni-
versity of Michigan looks at expectations over the coming year. On the other
hand, purchasing manager expectations are assessed regionally: the Chicago
PMI is widely regarded as the most representative of nationwide sentiment.
There are a number of empirical studies—see Akerlof and Shiller (2009),
footnote 9, page 179— aimed at testing whether confidence actually ‘causes’
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economic growth (interpreted in the sense of ‘Granger causality’ Granger
(1969)). These include Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) who produce quite
convincing evidence that this link exists2.
Following in the footsteps of Matsusaka and Sbordone, Howrey (2001) in-
vestigates the predictive power of the University of Michigan consumer confi-
dence index over the period 1961 to 1999. He finds that the consumer confi-
dence index is a statistically significant predictor of the future rate of growth
of real GDP and of recessions. He also finds that consumer confidence provides
a good point estimate of future consumer spending, albeit with a large stan-
dard error. In the case of Japan, Utaka (2003) finds that consumer confidence
has a short term impact on GDP growth, but no short term effect.
If confidence is a good predictor of macroeconomic trends and cycles, could
it also have an impact on asset prices? In an event study, Rigobon and Sack
(2008) test the impact of unexpected changes in 13 macroeconomic data series
including the Chicago PMI and consumer confidence on eurodollar futures
contracts, treasury yields and the S&P 500. They find that surprises in the
Chicago PMI and in consumer confidence have a statistically significant impact
on the rate of six-month and 12-months eurodollar futures contracts and on
the yields of 2-year and 10-year Treasuries, but not on the S&P 500.
Still, sentiment by and large plays a significant role in the behaviour of
stock markets, as evidenced for example by Baker and Wurgler (2006). It is
therefore natural to investigate specifically the relation between consumer con-
fidence and stock market returns. Jansen and Nahuis (2003) study the relation-
ship between stock market developments and consumer confidence in eleven
European countries over the period 1986-2001. Although consumer confidence
is positively correlated with stock market returns in nine countries, they did
not find statistical evidence that consumer confidence Granger-causes stock
market returns. To the contrary, stock market returns appears to Granger-
cause consumer confidence over a short horizon of two weeks to one month.
This result is intriguing, especially when we consider studies on leading eco-
nomic indicators. Hertzberg and Beckman (1989) find that consumer confi-
dence has a lead time of 14 months with respect to economic peaks while the
S&P has a shorter lead time of 8.5 months. The gap is narrower for economic
troughs: 4.5 months for consumer confidence versus 4 months for the S&P 500.
Fisher and Statman (2000, 2003) find that statistically significant increases
in the bullishness of individual investors follow increases in consumer confi-
dence. Over the period 1989 to 2002, large improvements in consumer con-
fidence appear to have be followed by high returns on the S&P 500 index,
NASDAQ index and among small caps. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)
find that consumer confidence is useful in forecasting the returns on small
stocks. Their view is that consumer confidence reflects not only current and
expected fundamentals but also excessive sentiment such as overoptimism and
2 Akerlof and Shiller (2009) somehow understate the reach of Matsusaka and Sbordone’s
argument.
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pessimism. As a result of excessive optimism (pessimism), investors will over-
value (undervalue) small stocks relative to large stocks.
The relation between investor or entrepreneur sentiment and asset market
is both important and complex, and more research is needed to understand
their connection. This is particularly true for real estate, for which the litera-
ture linking confidence and real estate prices is scarcer.
2.3 The Financial Instability Hypothesis
Recent crises in the U.S. mortgage market, Ireland or Spain, have demon-
strated that animal spirits and sentiment have a considerable influence on
the long-term evolution of financial markets and on the build-up of specula-
tive bubbles. Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky (1992, 2008) proposed a
Financial Instability Hypothesis to describes the journey of a financial mar-
ket from safe (hedge units) to speculative and then to untenably speculative
(Ponzi units3) investments. Minsky argues that investors tend to build long-
term predictions based on current conditions4: if current conditions are good,
investors will tend to extrapolate that financial conditions will remain favor-
able over the long run. As their risk tolerance declines, investors seek riskier
assets. This in turns pushes asset prices up and makes current financial con-
ditions look even more favorable. This feedback loop pushes investments into
ever more speculative assets up until the Ponzi stage is reached, triggering
a collapse of financial markets. To add to this instability, Minsky postulate
that longer periods of stability will ultimately generate higher risk taking and
ultimately more profound instability.
McCulley (2009) illustrates Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis in the
case of the subprime crisis in the United States. In first, or hedged unit, stage
of development, both lenders and investors are cautious. Loans are only ex-
tended to home buyers who have enough equity and earning power to pay back
both the principal and the interest. The liability inherent in the mortgage is
therefore properly hedged. As the market grows and house prices increase, we
enter the second, or speculative unit, stage. Lenders and investors have gained
in confidence. Loans are now extended to home buyers who have enough equity
and earning power to pay back the interest on the mortgage, but necessarily
the principal. Implicitly, lenders and investors speculate that mortgage rates
will not rise, mortgage terms will not deteriorate and house prices will not
decline. As optimism reaches unrealistic levels, the market transitions form
the second stage to the third, or Ponzi unit, stage. Lenders and investors take
an unsustainable amount of risk. Loans are now offered to home buyers who
3 Ponzi units are named after 1920s con artist Charles Ponzi.
4 Minsky’s view that investors predominently form their opinion based on recent data
is related to the availability heuristics first analyzed by Tversky and Kahneman (1973):
to make their decisions, individuals use short cuts (heuristics) such as extrapolating from
immediately available information, and in particular from the recent past.
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can neither afford to repay the principal nor the interest. Implicitly, lenders
and investors speculate that mortgage rates will not rise, mortgage terms will
not deteriorate and most importantly that house prices will keep on increasing.
2.4 Market-consistent valuation
Suppose we have a universe of liquidly-tradable assets whose current prices are
{Sj0, j = 1, . . . , n}. It is assumed that no arbitrage opportunities are presented
by trading at these prices. Now consider a further contract, denoted Y . This
could be another traded asset about to be launched, such as a call option on
one of the existing assets Sj , or more generally a non-traded or illiquid asset
such as a basket of insurance policies or mortgages. We say that a ‘price’ Y0 is
market consistent if offering Y for sale or purchase for Y0 does not introduce
arbitrage into the existing market. As an elementary example, consider the
1-period trinomial tree shown in Figure 1 modelling an asset S and suppose
there is a riskless account paying zero interest. By considering possible ‘risk-
neutral’ or ‘martingale’ measures (q1, q2, q3) readers can convince themselves
that 90 is an arbitrage-free price for S and that the no-arbitrage range of
prices for an at-the-money call option (strike K = 90) is the open interval
(5, 7.5). For any p ∈ (5, 7.5) there is a risk-neutral measure (qp1 , qp2 , qp3) such
that p = 30qp1 + 10q
p
2 , the risk-neutral call option price. Thus any option price
within this range is ‘market consistent’. It is in fact true in some generality,
see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011), that for general multi-period models the range
of market-consistent prices coincides with the set of discounted expectations
corresponding to all possible ‘martingale’ measures.
S0=90 q2
q1
q3 S3=80
S2=100
S1=120
Fig. 1 1-period trinomial tree.
In general, market-consistent valuation refers to the process of building a
model for (some section of) the market, calibrating it—i.e., choosing model
parameters so that the model reproduces prices of market-traded assets—and
then using the model to price another contract by risk-neutral valuation. By
definition, the enlarged market is then arbitrage-free. This process has been
routinely used for many years in investment banks under the name of marking
to market and traders are well aware of ‘model risk’, the fact that different
models for the underlying assets Sj , all perfectly calibrated to the same market
data, may give widely differing prices for the new asset Y .
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Recent developments in financial regulation and accounting practice have
forced the principle of market consistency onto a wider segments of the finan-
cial services industry, notably insurance and pensions. An excellent account
of the current state of play is given by Kemp (2009). How useful, or indeed
credible, this process is depends on ‘how complete’ the market is. If there is
no Sj that is sufficiently closely related to Y as to be useful for hedging then
the range of market-consistent prices will be too wide to be of any practical
significance without further modelling input or constraints. In addition, it is
important to realize that market consistent pricing is not synonymous with ra-
tional pricing. Market consistent pricing provides consistency across securities
prices at a time t by preventing instantaneous arbitrage. As a result, market
consistent pricing is procylical and as such it is susceptible to bubbles and
crashes over periods of time. The optimistic prices of loans and credit prod-
ucts booked by banks before the crisis and subsequent writedowns starting
2008 illustrate this points.
2.5 The nume´raire portfolio.
In elementary treatments of mathematical finance, call option prices are gen-
erally expressed, in conventional notation, as C(K) = EQ[e−rT (ST − K)+],
where EQ denotes expectation with respect to ‘the’ risk-neutral measure. This
is equivalent to C(K) = EQ[(ST − K)+/BT ] where Bt = ert, showing that
C(K) is the expected value of the option payoff expressed in units of the ‘sav-
ings account’ Bt. It turns out that using the savings account as nume´raire is
an arbitrary choice. The modern view, stated explicitly in Geman et al (1995)
and clearly expounded by Hunt and Kennedy (2004) for example, is to think
in terms of nume´raire pairs (N,Q), where Nt is a tradable asset with strictly
positive price, conventionally normalized to N0 = 1, and Q is a measure such
that for any traded asset S the price ratio St/Nt is a martingale. A key point
is that if one fixes the measure Q and searches for an asset price process NQ
such that (NQ,Q) is a nume´raire pair, then there is a unique solution, namely
that NQ is the growth-optimal portfolio5 when the asset prices are governed
by the probability law Q. The growth-optimal portfolio maximizes, over in-
vestment strategies π, the expected log-utility EQ[log W πT ] at some fixed time
T , where W πT is the value of the investment portfolio at time T using strategy
π, starting conventionally at W π0 = 1. If (N
Q,Q) is a nume´raire pair then
using the inequality log x ≤ x− 1 and the nume´raire property of NQ we have
EQ log W πT − EQ log NQT = EQ[log(W πT /NQT )] ≤ EQ[W πT /NQT ]− 1 = 0.
Thus NQT maximises logarithmic utility under Q.
J.B. Long (1990) first realized the significance of this fact, namely that
there is nothing stopping us choosing Q = P, the real-world ‘statistical’ mea-
sure governing asset prices, and then NP is the optimal investment portfolio
5 See MacLean et al (2011) for a comprehensive account of investment based on the
growth-optimal or ‘Kelly’ criterion
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for an investor with logarithmic utility, which is easily computed in many
cases. This approach has the decisive advantage that all modelling is carried
out under the statistical measure. It is the basis for Platen’s ‘benchmark ap-
proach’ to financial valuation Platen and Heath (2006). In our case we want
to include econometric factors such as confidence indices, GDP growth etc. in
our modelling framework. If we use the benchmark approach then econometric
models for these quantities, estimated using historical data, can be plugged
right into our model without worrying about the distinction between real-
world and risk-neutral measures since these two things are now one and the
same.
2.6 Structural models of credit risk.
Below we shall be considering investment funded by collateralized loans, where
the investor may default if he is unable to post sufficient additional margin in
case of a fall in the value of the collateral. In our model, the time at which
this happens will be a stopping time of some filtration. This is true of all
models in the modern theory of credit risk, although in this theory, as is seen
in textbooks such as Lando (2004), there are two distinct classes of model,
‘reduced form’ and ‘structural form’. The latter, which contains our model,
is ultimately derived from early work by Robert Merton (1974) in which the
default risk on corporate debt is represented as a put option on the value of
the firm. Modelling firm value accurately is not an easy thing to do (it is not
the same thing as market capitalization), and later modellers such as Hull and
White (2001) or Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) have concentrated on stylized
models in which default occurs at the first hitting time of a possibly time-
varying boundary by some stochastic process, where parameters specifying
the process and/or the boundary are calibrated from market credit default
swap quotes. Our model is in the same vein mathematically, but because we
model explicitly the collateral value and the evolution of the margin account
we return to a Merton-like picture where the credit model has economic as
well as mathematical content.
3 The Project Finance Model
We now proceed to a formal specification of our model.
3.1 Financial Market
We consider a simple model in which tradable asset prices Si(t), i = 1, . . . ,m
satisfy SDEs of the form
dSi(t) = Si(t)μi(X(t))dt + Si(t)σi(X(t))dWt, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.1)
dX(t) = α(X(t))dt + Λ(X(t))dWt, X(0) = x (3.2)
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for t ∈ [0, T ], where Wt is P-Brownian motion in Rn+m and X(t) is an n-
dimensional factor process on a filtered probability space (Ω,Ft,P). We assume
that α, Λ are Lipschitz continuous so that a unique strong solution of (3.2)
exists. Si(t) is then given explicitly by
Si(t) = Si(0) exp
(∫ t
0
(μi − 12 |σi|
2)ds +
∫ t
0
σidWs
)
. (3.3)
The short rate of interest available to E is r(X(t)) for some given function
r(∙). We will describe the components of the factor process X(t) below. The
integrability conditions on μi, σi are such that the integrals in (3.3) are well
defined and E[Si(t)] < ∞ for all i, t. The main point is that X(t) includes
confidence indices.
The log-optimal portfolio for this model is (omitting the X-dependence)
dY (t) = Y (t) (r + π∗ΣΣ′π′∗) dt + Y (t)π∗Σ dW, (3.4)
where π∗(t) = (μ−1 r)′(ΣΣ′)−1 is the optimal asset allocation (the allocation
to the money market account being π0∗ = 1 − π∗1). Here μ [Σ] is the vector
[matrix] with rows μi [σi] and 1 is the vector with all entries equal to 1. We
assume that, for some ² > 0, s′ΣΣ′(x)s ≥ ²|s|2 for all (s, x) ∈ Rm+n, which
is equivalent to saying that there are no redundant assets. Equation (3.4) can
be expressed as
dY (t) = Y (t)(r + β2)dt + Y (t)β dBt, (3.5)
where Bt is the scalar Brownian motion
Bt =
∫ t
0
π∗Σ(s)
|π∗Σ(s)|dWs
and β(t) = |π∗(t)Σ(t)|. With initial endowment Y (0) = 1, equation (3.5) has
explicit solution
Y (t) = exp
(∫ t
0
(r +
1
2
β2)ds +
∫ t
0
β dBs
)
. (3.6)
We are going to use the log-optimal portfolio Y (t) given by (3.5) for two
different purposes:
(a) It is assumed that entrepreneur E is a log-optimal (“Kelly”) investor, so
that his surplus wealth (capital not invested in the project) is just x0Y (t) if his
initial surplus wealth is x0. (This will hold up to the time of B’s first margin
call; see below.)
(b) Y (t) is the nume´raire asset, so the risk-neutral value at t of an FT -
measurable payment H paid at T is
Ht = Y (t)E
[
H
Y (T )
∣∣∣∣Ft] . (3.7)
This is the valuation formula used by B.
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A discrete-time formulation. Most of the econometric data we consider, such
as confidence indices, is posted monthly. Let us suppose that T is an integer
number n of months, and denote by 0 = t0, t1, . . . , tn−1 the first day of each
monthly period. If Xi(∙), the ith component of the factor process X(∙), is an
econometric variable based on monthly data then we simply define Xi(t) =
Xi(tk) for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). If every component of X(∙) is obtained from discrete
data in this way then equation (3.6) has piecewise-constant coefficients, and
the solution Y (tk) can be expressed as
Y (tk) =
k∏
j=1
Uj , Uj = exp
(
(rj +
1
2
β2j )δj + βj
√
δjZj
)
(3.8)
where δj = tj − tj−1, rj = r(X(tj−1)), βj = β(X(tj−1)), and the Zj are
independent N(0, 1) random variables.
Let {Gk, k = 0, . . . , n} be the discrete filtration where G0 is the trivial
σ-field and Gk = σ{B(tj) − B(tj−1), j = 1, . . . , k} for k = 1, . . . , n. If H is
a Gn-measurable random variable then we see from (3.7) and (3.8) that the
value at time tk is
Htk = E
 n∏
j=k+1
U−1j
H
∣∣∣∣∣∣Gk
 . (3.9)
3.2 Project Finance
The project finance valuation problem was informally described in Section 1.
The entrepreneur E has initial capital x and can, for a payment $A, invest
in a venture which, at time T = n months, will yield a reward G(X(T )) as
above. G is a function that will be specified below, but it is a function of X(T )
only and hence is GT -measurable. He invests $a of his own money and borrows
$b = A−a from a bank at a term rate of interest rc (expressed for convenience
in continuously-compounding terms), repayable by a bullet payment at T .
Thus effectively his initial capital is reduced to x0 = x− a while the eventual
reward is G(X(T )) − ercT b. The capital x0 is invested in the Kelly portfolio
described above.
The value of the project at an intermediate time tk is deemed by the bank
B to be the market-consistent value Gk(X(tk)) given by (3.9) as
Gk = E
 n∏
j=k+1
U−1j
G(X(T ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣Gk
 . (3.10)
The loan is collateralized by the value of the project, and B stipulates over-
collateralization with factors κ > κ′ > 1, checked at monthly intervals. Thus
G0 ≥ κb and in any subsequent verification time k we have
Gk(X(t)) ≥ κ′berctk .
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Defining Hk(x) = e−rctkGk(x) this is equivalent to Hk ≥ κ′b. Let
θ1 = min{k : Hk ≤ κ′b}, τ1 = tθ1 ,
b1 =
Hθ1
κ
.
At τ1, E is contractually obliged to provide additional collateral to restore the
collateral level to κ by paying off the amount d1 = ercτ1(b − b1) of the loan.
Since the project is illiquid, he can only do this from his investment portfolio,
and hence this experiences a jump of −d1. In general, we define for j = 2, 3, . . .
θj = min{k : θj−1 < k < n, Hk ≤ κ′bj−1}, τj = tθj ,
bj =
Hθj
κ
giving a jump in V of −dj = −ercτj (bj−1 − bj). The entrepreneur’s market
investment portfolio evolves as follows:
V (t) = V (0) +
∫ t
0
(r + β2)V (s)ds +
∫ t
0
V (s)βdBs −
∑
τj≤t
dj .
Let τ∗ = min{τj : V (τj) < 0}, with τ∗ = +∞ if there is no such tj , and
let θ∗ = j when τ∗ = tj . If τ∗ < T the entrepreneur is insolvent at τ∗ and
the project must be liquidated at ‘fire sale’ value F (τ∗) = φ(τ∗)Gθ∗(X(τ∗)),
where φ is an increasing function of time with values in [0, 1[. The bank receives
F (τ∗) + V (τ∗−).
The market-consistent value of the loan to the bank is therefore
MCV = E
∑
j
dj
Y (τj)
1(τj<τ∗∧T ) +
bn ∧ (V (T ) + G(X(T )))
Y (T )
1(τ∗>T )
+
F (τ∗) + V (τ∗−)
Y (τ∗)
1(τ∗<T )
]
. (3.11)
We thus have a credit risk model. The bank loses value because of early partial
repayment of the loan together with the risk of actual default. Define pk =
(1 + rfk/12)
−1 where rfk is the Bank’s (annualized) funding cost for the kth
month, and p0,k =
∏k
l=1 pl. Then, recalling that the initial loan amount is b,
the Bank’s P&L along one sample path, discounted to time 0, is
Ξ(ω) =
∑
j
p0,θj dj1(τj<τ∗∧T ) + p0,n[bn ∧ (V (T ) + G(T ))]1(τ∗>T )
+ p0,θ∗ [F (τ∗) + V (τ∗−)]1(τ∗<T ) − b.
The Bank will be interested in the expected profit e = E[Ξ], the value at risk
VaR = e − q, where q is the (say) 5% quantile of the P&L distribution, and
the expected shortfall
CVaR = e− E[Ξ|Ξ < q] = e− 1
q
E
[
Ξ1(Ξ<q)
]
.
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4 A simply computable example
In this section we demonstrate the computations required in a simple example
where the factor process is a scalar Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. This is a
stylized model intended mainly to illustrate the computational process. We do
not attempt to connect the factor variable to econometric data, an entirely
separate matter.
4.1 Model specification
Recall that the nume´raire asset is Yt satisfying
dYt = (r(Xt) + β2(Xt))Ytdt + β(Xt)YtdBt, Y0 = 1. (4.1)
In this example we suppose that Xt is scalar, β(x) = b0 + b1x and r(x) =
r0 + r1x. Xt is the mean-reverting Gaussian process
dXt = −αXtdt + γdWt, X0 = x0, (4.2)
where α, γ > 0 are constant and Wt is a Brownian motion with E[dW dB] =
ρ dt. The project value at completion is defined by G(XT ) = eη+ξXT . This
is analogous to conventional modelling of commodity prices as exponentials
of mean-reverting processes. Note that ξ represents, up to a constant, the
volatility of project value.
The Bank’s valuation of the project at t < T is
G(t,Xt) = E
[
Yt
YT
eη+ξXT
∣∣∣∣Ft] . (4.3)
Proposition 4.1 Let c0 = γρb0, c1 = α + γρb1, d = r1/c1. Then
G(t, x) = exp(v0(t) + v1(t)x) (4.4)
where
v1(t) = (ξ + d)e−c1(T−t) − d, (4.5)
v0(t) = η −
(
r0 − c0d− 12γ
2d2
)
(T − t)− (ξ + d)(c0 + γ2d)
[
1
c1
(1− e−c1(T−t))
]
+
1
2
γ2(ξ + d)2
[
1
2c1
(1− e−2c1(T−t))
]
. (4.6)
Proof. The result follows from the fact that (4.1),(4.2) is an affine factor
model Duffie et al (2000). We outline the steps, which can be completed by
routine—if tedious—computations.
(i) The risk-neutral measure Q with money-market account as nume´raire is
defined by
dQ
dP
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
β dB − 1
2
∫ T
0
β2dt
)
.
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If we express Wt in (4.2) as Wt = ρBt +
√
1− ρ2 W 0t , where B,W 0 are P-
independent Brownian motions, then dB˜ = dB+β dt, W 0t and dW
1
t = ρ dB˜t +√
1− ρ2 dW 0 are Q-independent Brownian motions and Xt satisfies
dXt = −(γρb0 + (α + γρb1)Xt)dt + γ dW 1t
= − (c0 + c1Xt) dt + γ dW 1t .
(ii) The project value is expressed under the measure Q as G(t,Xt) where
G(t, x) = EQt,x
[
e−
∫ T
t
r(s)dseη+ξXT
]
.
(iii) By the Feynman-Kac formula, v(t, x) satisfies the backward equation
∂G
∂t
− (c0 + c1x)∂G
∂x
+
1
2
γ2
∂2G
∂x2
− (r0 + r1x)G = 0, G(T, x) = eη+ξx. (4.7)
(iv) The PDE (4.7) has solution (4.4) where v1, v0 are given respectively by
(4.5), (4.6). Indeed, one can check that a solution of the form (4.4) satisfies
(4.7) if v1 satisfies the ODE
d
dt
v1(t) = c1v1(t) + r1, v1(T ) = ξ,
whose solution is (4.5). v0 is then given by direct integration of the following
expression involving v1:
d
dt
v0(t) = c0v1(t)− 12γ
2 (v1(t))
2 + r0, v0(T ) = η,
Working this out gives (4.6). ¤
With Proposition 4.1 in hand, we can estimate the project value MCV
of (3.11), and the VaR and CVaR, by Monte Carlo simulation. Note that
simulation is exact, because of the discrete-time formulation, in that the result
ultimately depends only on a finite vector of N(0, 1) random variables.
4.2 Results
We consider a project with initial cost A = $12 (or $12, 000, 000) and an
entrepreneur with initial cash of x0 = $10. We assume that the project price
is “fair”, in the sense that it coincides with the risk-neutral value at time 0.
The parameters of the model are presented in Table 1. Note that η can be
determined given the initial price of the project and the other parameters.
The entrepreneur can be considered rather respectable—he has almost
enough cash to finance the entire project without resorting to loans. Given
the overcollateralization requirement imposed by the bank, the entrepreneur
may choose to borrow between $2 and $10, and he invests the surplus of be-
tween $8 and $0 respectively in the market. Figure 2 shows CVaR of the loan
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r0 0.03 α 0.90
r1 0.01 γ 0.80
b0 0.01 ρ 0.70
b1 0.01 rc 0.05
T 5 dt 1/12
κ 1.2 κ′ 1.1
ξ 1 η 1.948
Table 1 Parameter Values
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
CV
aR
Initial value of the loan
Risk of the loan with respect to initial loan notional
CVaR (xi=1)
CVaR (xi=1.5)
Fig. 2 CVaR for different initial loan values, expressed as a fraction of the initial value of
the loan.
from the bank’s perspective, plotted against the notional of the loan. All the
values are presented as the fraction of the initial value of the loan.
The immediate thing we notice in Figure 2 is that the risk behaves in
a completely different way for different levels of project volatility ξ. Under
normal market conditions (ξ = 1, which gives the project a similar volatility
as the stock market) the bank prefers, from the risk management perspective,
lower loans. This is perfectly intuitive, because the initial value of the collateral
is the same for loans with different notionals and equal to A = $12. The lower-
value loans hardly ever default—around 1.1% of them compared to 6.1% for
loans with value $10.
In the case of high volatility (ξ = 1.5, when the market for the project
is possibly in crisis or distress), the situation becomes very different. Despite
the lower-value loans having a lower probability of default—9% for $3 loans
comparing to 14.5% for $10 loans, the higher-value loans have smaller risk.
The key to understanding this seeming paradox is to notice that loans with
higher values leave the entrepreneur with more liquid assets. These assets are
used to cover the margin payments, so the bank can recover large proportion
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of the loan before default, whereas in the case of minimal loan first margin call
immediately causes insolvency. Moreover, the entrepreneur invests his liquid
assets in the market. The extra leverage causes more volatility and defaults,
but also increases his average return, and hence the amount of money the bank
can recover.
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
Distribution of values. Loan $3.
Fig. 3 Distribution of values for loan with initial value $3 and ξ = 1.5. The average is 3.26
and CVaR = 0.77.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the value of the loan with notional
of $3 and $10 respectively. In both cases the graph has two distinct peaks:
the one with values above the notional corresponds to no-default scenarios,
whereas the other one contains values after default. The values are dispersed
because of the effect of stochastic discount rates, random early repayments
and—for the relevant cases—different default times. We immediately notice
that in the $3 notional case more mass is in the no-default peak comparing to
the $10 case, but the returns if default occurs are proportionately much lower.
Figures 5 and 6 stress this point even more. They depict the distribution
of the outstanding loan value for the cases that ended up in default (taken
just before the default time and discounted suitably). In these figures we can
clearly see that in most cases almost half of the $10 loan is repaid early, whereas
in a considerable percentage of cases the first margin call made the $3 loan
default. Note that these defaults are much more costly for the bank (in terms
of percentage of the initial loan value).
For all considered ξ and loan values the defaults happen mostly just before
the maturity of the project, see for example Figure 7.
The entrepreneur always prefers to borrow more, so that he has more
leverage and more potential to earn money. His losses are only limited to
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Distribution of values. Loan $10.
Fig. 4 Distribution of values for loan with initial value $10 and ξ = 1.5. The average is
10.74 and CVaR 1.82.
 0
 0.002
 0.004
 0.006
 0.008
 0.01
 0.012
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
Distribution of (discounted) outstanding loan amonts just before default. Initial notional $3.
Fig. 5 Distribution of (discounted) outstanding loan just before default for the initial loan
value $3 and ξ = 1.5. This graph contains only cases that ended up in default. Total default
probability is 0.08.
his initial capital x0 = $10, and—as is apparent in Figure 8—the potential
gains are very high. For the initial loan value of $6, even in the normal risk
circumstances (ξ = 1) the entrepreneur has a positive probability to earn more
than ten times his initial investment. In high risk case this goes up to almost
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 0  2  4  6  8  10  12
Distribution of (discounted) outstanding loan amonts just before default. Initial notional $10.
Fig. 6 Distribution of (discounted) outstanding loan just before default for the initial loan
value $10 and ξ = 1.5. This graph contains only cases that ended up in default. Total default
probability is 0.13.
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Month
Distribution of defaults. Loan $6.
Fig. 7 Distribution of default times for loan with initial value $6 and ξ = 1.5. Total default
probability is 0.10.
thirty times his initial investment. Despite the single most probable outcome in
both cases is a loss (a default in high risk case), the entrepreneur has a positive
profit expectation of $3.57 in the low risk case and $4.53 in the high risk case.
This kind of highly asymmetric payoff characteristics foster the entrepreneurs
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 0
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profit
P&L normal risk (xi=1)
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Fig. 8 Distribution of P&L of the entrepreneur with the initial loan value $6. In case of
default P&L is set to −$10, otherwise it is the difference between the discounted value of
the project and the stock account at maturity minus the outstanding loan, and the initial
capital of the entrepreneur x0 = $10. The average profit in the case ξ = 1 is $3.57 and in
the case ξ = 1.5 it is $4.53. The right-hand panel has a 100 times smaller scale.
drive to invest and provide examples of others who succeeded in a spectacular
way—even though most of them failed. Being an “optimist” in Keynes’ sense
is perfectly rational in this model.
When agreeing to the loan amount in normal market circumstances the
entrepreneur will prefer to borrow as much as possible, but the risk-optimizing
bank will prefer to lend much less—because the risk increases with the notional
of the loan. Figure 9 shows that this statement is only true in the case of ξ
being around unity. Based on this parameter we can distinguish three market
regimes: very low risk regime with ξ < 0.5, normal market circumstances
(0.5 < ξ < 1.2) and high risk market (ξ > 1.5). In the first case the project is
bound to succeeded and the bank only faces interest rate risk. Hence the risk
doesn’t depend on the value of the loan. As discussed, in the normal case the
bank prefers to have more collateral compared to the amount of the loan. In
the high risk case, however, things change dramatically. It becomes less risky
for the bank to offer maximum loans to the entrepreneurs. For the economy it
may have severe consequences: on the one hand these loans have much higher
probability of default—which can be further aggravated by contagion effects,
and on the other the bank starts having big items on its balance sheet. Even
one default of these big loans could deplete the bank’s Tier 1 capital and cause
its collapse.
Although not explicit in here, the ξ parameter can be assumed to be linked
to the agents’ perception of the state of the market, with higher ξ meaning
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Fig. 9 CVaR for different values of project volatility (ξ), expressed as a fraction of the
initial loan amount.
more volatility and uncertainty. Then a crisis would mean a shift from the
lower risk regime to a higher one, with all the economic implications.
The mechanism of margin payments is effective way to minimize the risk for
the bank only for large loans in the volatile case, but somewhat surprisingly not
in other cases. In all cases introduction of forced early repayments increases the
number of defaults between 2.5 and 6 times and in normal market conditions
it increases the bank’s risk as well. In particular, if a bank decides to give a
“safe” loan of $3 under normal volatility conditions then the margin payments
are inefficient from the very start. But if a crisis begins and volatility rises, it
gets much worse. Looking at Figure 2 the risk will increase more than threefold
and the mechanism of early repayments becomes even greater burden for the
bank and the economy.
4.3 Computations for the general case
The above computation is in two stages: solve the backward equation (4.7) to
determine the project valuation function G of (4.3), then simulate (forwards)
to determine the value of the project and the risk parameters. In our example
the first stage is easy because the backward equation has the closed-form
solution (4.4). However, when we have a general factor model with, say, 5 or 6
factors, a numerical method will be required, and the dimensionality stretches
standard finite-difference methods up to, or beyond, their normal limits. The
best candidates seem to be stochastic mesh methods, see Glasserman (2003),
and specifically the basis function approach originally devised by Longstaff
and Schwartz (2001) for American options. While computationally intensive
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these methods have the advantage that the same set of sample paths used
for the forward simulation is also used to solve the backward equation. They
are becoming the methods of choice for large-scale credit risk calculations, see
Cesari et al (2010).
5 Quantifying Animal Spirits
With our computational framework in place, the next step is to return to the
discussion of confidence indices in Section 2.2 above in an effort to determine
what are the leading indicators of confidence, or over-confidence or irrational
exuberance. The papers cited in that section show that there is some debate
about the relationship of confidence indices to stock market returns. While we
have not analysed this in detail, anecdotal evidence such as the data presented
in Figure 10 indicates that there is some appreciable connection between con-
fidence indices and non-financial indicators of economic activity, in this case
the growth rate of the composite Case-Shiller house price index. It would be
meaningless to impute any causal relationship on the basis of this data alone,
but clearly there is some relationship. Possibly a better approach would be to
regard animal spirits as a hidden variable (Bhar and Hamori 2004),(Mamon
and Elliott 2007), to be tracked on the basis of observed series. This would en-
capsulate the idea that optimism/pessimism are relatively long-lived ‘states’;
in a model, switches between them could be picked up in minimal time using
‘quickest detection’ algorithms (Poor and Hadjiliadis 2009).
All of these suggestions are topics for future research.
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